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La piratería marítima y su caracterización como amenaza: 
presencia, tipo, armas, violencia y barcos bajo ataque entre 1991 y 
2019
Resumen: la piratería marítima es una amenaza para el comercio marítimo cuya versión contempo-
ránea ha sido abordada legalmente por la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del 
Mar (cdm) y la Organización Marítima Internacional (omi) y coercitivamente por la onu y la ue. El pre-
sente artículo analiza la piratería marítima desde la perspectiva teórica de la Escuela de Copenhague 
y su aplicación a los informes anuales de la Cámara de Comercio Internacional sobre la piratería, cuya 
información oscila entre 1991 y 2019. El análisis indica dos períodos de aumento, caracterizados por 
presencia, tipo, armas, violencia y barcos atacados.
Palabras clave:  piratería marítima; Escuela de Copenhague; Sureste de Asia y África
A pirataria marítima e sua caracterização como ameaça: presença, 
tipo, armas, violência e navios atacados entre 1991 e 2019
Resumo: a pirataria marítima é uma ameaça para o comércio marítimo cuja versão contemporânea vem 
sendo abordada legalmente pela United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea e pela Organização 
Marítima Internacional, e coercitivamente pela Organização das Nações Unidas e pela União Europeia. 
Neste artigo, é analisada a pirataria marítima a partir da perspectiva teórica da Escola de Copenhague 
e sua aplicação nos relatórios anuais da Câmara de Comércio Internacional sobre a Pirataria, com infor-
mações de 1991 a 2019. A análise indica dois períodos de aumento, caracterizados por presença, tipo, 
armas, violência e navios atacados.
Palavras-chave:  pirataria marítima; Escola de Copenhague; Sudeste da Ásia e África
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Introduction
Maritime piracy is a long-standing threat or risk 
for security. In fact, what we see today globally is a 
contemporary version of an ancient issue. Patricia 
Risso (2001), in an article on culture and maritime 
piracy, concludes that the age of piracy is evidenced 
by language. The author points out that the word 
peirates in Ancient Greece referred to a “broad 
range of maritime violence in the multi-coastal en-
vironment of Greece and the wider Mediterranean” 
(2001, p. 296) and that its evolution to pirate in An-
cient Rome identified an “enemy of all humanity” 
(2001, p. 297). Other examples are the Dutch term 
freebooter, which referred to a “rogue adventurer or 
mercenary” (2001, p. 297), the French word bucca-
neer to refer to “a pirate in the Caribbean” (2001, 
p. 297), and the Latin word corsair, which means 
“pirate in the Mediterranean” (2001, p. 297).
As for the former examples, maritime piracy 
was active in ancient Mediterranean civilizations; 
therefore, we might suppose such threat or risk 
is inherent to maritime trading. Piracy is treat-
ed as a criminal matter that leads to mercenaries 
and pirates’ financial gain. Today, authors such as 
Bolaños (2013) and Morales (2014) characterize 
maritime piracy as oil theft, illicit trafficking, ir-
regular migration, and illegal exploitation of ma-
rine resources.
At present, two sources provide a legal defini-
tion of maritime piracy. First, the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) in 
1980 defined “piracy” as an illegal act of violence 
of detention or predation for personal purposes. It 
is performed from a private ship or aircraft against 
another ship, aircraft, people or their belongings 
at high sea or waters with no state jurisdiction, 
implying the voluntary participation, incitement, 
or facilitation. Second, the International Maritime 
Organization (imo) created in 2009 the Code of 
Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy 
and Armed Robbery against Ships. It quotes the 
unclos to define maritime piracy and contributes 
the classification of “armed robbery against ships,” 
including their threatening actions; that is to say, 
when the felony is not yet committed or when 
it may not qualify as maritime piracy. Besides, 
it expands the location to inland waters, archipela-
go, and territorial waters.
The International Chamber of Commerce (icc), 
on its annual reports1—Piracy and armed robbery 
against ships—lists 7,671 total attacks and 12,957 
crew victims of violence between 1991 and 2019. 
These reports classify piracy attacks per region and 
location, status of ships during the attack, type of 
attack, type of arm used, type of violence to crew, 
nationality of ships attacked, and type of vessel at-
tacked. It should be noted that attacks are divided 
into actual and attempted.
By analyzing Risso’s (2001) signifier and mean-
ing, unclo’s and imo’s legal perspective, and icc’s 
classification and definition, we may present the 
following research question: How can maritime 
piracy be characterized as a threat? The answer to it 
involves the analysis of the categories and features 
pointed out above; therefore, piracy is addressed in 
all its temporary extension and total attacks per re-
gion and location, type of attack, type of arm, type 
of violence to crew, nationality of ships attacked, 
and type of vessel attacked.
From the perspective of International Studies, 
maritime piracy is marginalized in its full charac-
terization, thus becoming the motivation to pose 
the question and answer it. An example of it is the 
World Politics handbook. Its fifth edition (Kegley 
& Wittkopf, 1995), in the part of “non-state actors,” 
mentions international agencies and multinational 
corporations and, for “force employment,” shows 
inter-state and intra-state wars. In this case, non-
state actors exclude threatening agents, and coer-
cive force is connected only to wars, which is very 
typical of the 1990s global security, even though 
The Naples Political Declaration and Global Ac-
tion Plan already existed in 1994. 
As for “non-state actors,” the ninth edition 
(Kegley & Wittkopf, 2004) maintains the same 
information as in 1995 and, for “armed conflict,” 
adds terrorism. The latest edition (Kegley & Blan-
ton, 2017) includes crime for “non-state agents,” 
exposing maritime piracy, and maintains the view 
1  These icc reports are available at https://www.imo.org/
en/OurWork/Security/Pages/Piracy-Reports-Default.
aspx.
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of its previous edition for “armed conflict.” This 
change is explained by Al-Qaeda’s attack against 
the United States of America on September 11, 
2001, and the effective date of the Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime in 2004, 
where safety and security priorities were reformu-
lated at the global, regional, and State levels. There-
fore, the coercive action—use of force and armed 
conflict—against crime—non-state actor or non-
state agent—is inherent to global security in the 
21st century. As for maritime piracy as a threat, its 
appearance is novel and marginal, despite its long 
historical existence and current relevance.
This article is divided into two sections. The 
first section contains the theoretical discussion 
that supports the analysis of existing data on 
threats, based on academic sources from the Co-
penhagen School. The second section analyzes 
the icc reports from 2000 to 2019, which are the 
primary sources reporting maritime piracy in-
ternationally since 1991, together with tables and 
figures containing processed information. Final-
ly, the conclusion presents the answer to our re-
search question.
Threats as a theoretical issue
The Copenhagen School provides one of the 
most influential perspectives on security studies. 
Hampson (1998) and Smith (1999) highlight that 
their approach is broad and deep, including sectors 
such as the environment, economy, and society. 
Therefore, this School can provide a clear expla-
nation of the security priorities established during 
this century.
One of the books of this School, People, states 
and fear by Barry Buzan (1991), points out that 
security is the state’s ability to maintain its inde-
pendent identity and functional integrity, while 
insecurity is the sum of all vulnerabilities and 
threats. State vulnerability (Buzan, 1991) is clas-
sified as high, particular, or relative according to 
its military power and institutional cohesion. For 
example, as the author points out, Angola is weak 
in power and cohesion, being highly vulnerable to 
all kinds of threats; Japan is strong in power and 
cohesion, being relatively invulnerable to all kinds 
of threats; Singapore is weak in power and strong 
in cohesion, being particularly vulnerable to mili-
tary threats; India is strong in power and weak in 
cohesion, being especially vulnerable to political 
threats. 
As for threats (Buzan, 1991), the idea is sus-
tained that they have difficulty being inserted 
in a subjective and objective reality, making it 
impossible to perform any measurement, even 
more for being imperceptible. Another difficulty 
lies in distinguishing between normal competence 
in the international system and actual threats, 
which becomes evident when trivial and routine 
affairs become serious and extraordinary. Then, 
insecurity presents an internal variability of qual-
ified vulnerability regarding military power and 
institutional cohesion and, at the same time, an 
external variability of threats whose qualification 
or quantification is complex. The author groups 
security problems into five sectors: military, po-
litical, economic, social, and ecological. From the 
military sector, the highlights are that: 
The level of military threats varies from harassment 
of fishing boats, through punishment raids, terri-
torial seizures and full invasions, to assaults on the 
very existence of the populace by blockade or bom-
bardment (…) threats to allies, shipping lines (…) 
military threats occupy a special category precisely 
because they involve the use of force (Buzan, 1991, 
p. 116).
Two ideas arise about the military sector based 
on the quote presented above. First, the minimum 
requirement for the existence of a military threat is 
the coercive use of force. Second, the expression of 
a military threat does not involve the State armed 
forces only; on the contrary, it is quite heteroge-
neous and includes private agents, like in maritime 
piracy. The Copenhagen School’s book Security: A 
new framework for analysis by Buzan et al. (1998), 
contains a complete chapter on the military sector. 
Its centrality leads to the affirmation that a varied 
kind of security problems affect the military sector, 
creating a tendency in underdeveloped countries 
to increase military actions against non-military 
threats. It should be noted that the military sector 
has great explanatory capacity at the regional and 
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local levels, being involved in brute force events 
whenever there is an increase of “military function” 
(Buzan et al. 1998, p. 49), such as protecting the civil 
population in natural disasters, supporting the gov-
ernments in their public policies, and facing crime.
Returning to People, states and fear, it char-
acterizes threats by their intensity level, includ-
ing diffuse or specific identity (understood as the 
agents exerting the threat and their resources); dis-
tance or closeness in space (the one that separates 
the threat from its objective); distance or closeness 
in time (that the threat needs for its attack); high 
or low probability (as measured according to the 
frequency of occurrence); high or low impact 
(the costs of the threat being effective in its attack); 
historically neutral or extended (regarding its his-
tory) (Buzan, 1991). As a result, we obtain an un-
derstanding of the behavior of a threat, in other 
words, we go from the difficulties of a subjective 
view to qualification and quantification based on 
reality, not on perception.
Complementing the idea of threat intensity, the 
Copenhagen School’s book Regions and Powers: The 
Structure of International Security by Buzan and 
Waever (2003) proposes a regional view to under-
stand security. The authors formulate the regional 
security complex theory based not only on territory 
and power materialism, but also on constructivism 
regarding the political process of interactions. They 
achieve explanatory capacity when understand se-
curity as the place where national and internation-
al security interact, that is, regions, and the place 
where States cannot be considered autonomous. 
About intensity, both have the understanding ca-
pacity to locate the threatening agent and indicate 
its probability, impact, and history.
Summing up, the security of maritime trade is 
affected by a lack of both control over its ships and 
integrity of its operation. Insecurity expressed as 
vulnerability is the States’ incapacity to confront 
maritime piracy, while insecurity expressed as 
threats is equal to maritime piracy’s quantity and 
quality. In the military sector, this is reflected in 
the coercive and heterogeneous features of these 
threats; the region interprets the agent, distance in 
space and time, probability, impact, and history of 
the threat.
Annual reports on maritime 
piracy
During 2000, maritime piracy increased due to 
seven factors, according to Peter Chalk (2008): in-
creased traffic of maritime trade, maritime conges-
tion in bottleneck zones, the Asian financial crisis, 
deficient maritime surveillance, weak coast and 
port security, corruption of national justice, 
and proliferation of small weapons. In short, this 
current threat resurges with an economic crisis, 
increased maritime trade, and weak punitive re-
sponse; when the threat originates, it later varies 
within regions and countries.
For its part, as Fernando Marin (2011) indi-
cates, the United Nations Security Council voted 
a series of resolutions to face this threat, namely, 
Resolution numbers 1814, 1816, 1838, 1846, and 
1851 of 2008, which intended to protect maritime 
convoys of the United Nations World Food Pro-
gramme (wfp) from maritime piracy in the Soma-
li coasts. Years later, through Resolutions number 
1897 of 2009, 1918, and 1950 of 2010, they extended 
previous resolutions’ dates and functions.
This initiative had good but circumstantial re-
sults. Piracy went down considerably between the 
end of 2010 and the beginning of 2011. However, 
as Ignacio Frutos (2012) points out, piracy adapt-
ed and went from the assault on small ships to the 
assault on big ships and the kidnapping of their 
crews. As he explains, this adaptation occurred 
because the Somalis saw piracy as a way out to 
their national economic crisis and as an alternative 
for employment, group identity, and social status. 
This adaptation is also explained by the coercive 
response, as Pablo Moral affirms (2015), as the Eu-
ropean Union’s Operation Atalanta that came into 
effect in 2008 and the nato’s Ocean Shield—cur-
rent between 2009 and 2016—, conditioning pira-
cy actions. 
The icc annual reports contain information 
from 1991 to 2019. From the most general, the to-
tal attacks mark a first increase period between 
1998 and 2003 and a second increase period be-
tween 2006 and 2011 (Table 1; Figure 1). 
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Table	1. Total attacks by region 1991-2019
Region Number of cases Percentage
Southeast Asia 2,900 37.80
Africa 2,467 32.16
Indian subcontinent 845 11.01
America 760 9.90
Far East 537 7.00
Rest of the world 121 1.60
Location not available 41 0.53
Total 7,671 100
Source: Own elaboration.
Figure	1. Total attacks 1991-2019 
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Piracy location, that is, the total attacks by 
region and location provide a regional, state, or 
location panoptic view, with absolute and relative 
figures (Tables 2, 3, and 4; Figures 2, 3, and 4).
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Table	2. Total attacks by location 1991-2019






Rest of the world 3,951 51.52
Total 7,671 100
Source: Own elaboration.
Figure	2. Total attacks by region 1991-2019 (A)
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Table	3. Total attacks by location 1998-2003
Location Number of cases Percentage
Indonesia 609 28.17
Bangladesh 204 9.61
Strait of Malacca 139 6.55
India 133 6.27
Malaysia 87 4.70
Rest of the world 949 44.7
Total 2,121 100
Source: Own elaboration.
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Figure	3. Total attacks by region 1991-2019 (B)
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Table	4. Total attacks by location 2006-2011
Location Number of cases Percentage
Somalia/Djibouti 439 21.01
Indonesia 222 10.62
Gulf of Aden 207 9.90
Red Sea/ Gulf of Aden 155 7.41
Nigeria 152 7.27
Bangladesh 125 5.98
Red Sea 79 3.78
Malaysia 79 3.78
Rest of the world 631 30.25
Total 2,089 100
Source: Own elaboration.
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Figure	4. Total attacks by region 1991-2019 (C)
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For the total timeframe between 1991 and 
2019, the regional number results separate the 
“rest of the world” and “location not available” 
from other categories due to their low figures, 
reaching only 2.13 % of cases. On the contrary, 
regions of the highest importance are Southeast 
Asia with 2,900 cases and Africa with 2,467 cas-
es, totaling 69.96 %; second in importance is the 
Indian subcontinent, America, and the Far East 
together reaching 27.91 %. Location per coun-
try shows Indonesia (23.46) %, Somalia/Djibouti 
(8.03 %), Nigeria (6.71 %), Bangladesh (6.06 %), 
and India (4.22 %), confirming Southeast Asia, 
Africa, and the Indian subcontinent as the ones 
with the highest piracy levels.
The figures for regions with the highest levels 
show that the maximum records occur in South-
east Asia and Africa alternately; that is, there is a 
continuous inverse correlation, evidencing move-
ment of maritime privacy. In fact, during 2006, 
2012, and 2017 there is an overlap between these 
regions, with reverse increases and decreases. 
The maximum number of records for Southeast 
Asia were found in Indonesia with 609 cases and 
the Strait of Malacca with 139 cases for the first 
increase period (1998–2003); in turn, Indone-
sia had 222 cases for the second increase period 
(2006–2011); finally, Malaysia presented with 87 
and 79 cases in both increase periods respectively. 
For its part, Africa had 439 cases in Somalia/Dji-
bouti, 441 in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden, and 152 in 
for the second increase period, showing an inverse 
correlation at the country level.
For the regions considered second in impor-
tance during the first increase period, the Indian 
subcontinent registered 352 cases, whose most 
typical examples were Bangladesh with 204 cases 
and India with 133 cases; for the second increase 
period, only Bangladesh appears with 125 cas-
es. America registered 260 cases, where the most 
notorious cases were Ecuador adding up to 47 
cases, and Brazil, with 42 cases; as for the second 
increase period, the region does not have any sig-
nificant records. East Asia never went over 20 cases 
between 1996 and 2008, but in the second increase 
period, registered 90 cases, including South China 
Sea with 61 cases. 
Africa and America exhibited similar charac-
teristics initially, as both grew steadily between 
1994 and 2004, their figures were always below 100 
cases, and their highest numbers concentrated at 
the beginning of the century. However, both re-
gions tend to differ for the second increase period. 
While America maintained records like the ones 
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reached in 2004, Africa showed an unprecedented 
growth from 2006 on, becoming the location where 
most of the attacks took place and reaching maxi-
mum regional levels for the second increase period.
Similar situations are found in Southeast Asia 
and East Asia, as maritime piracy had its first cases 
in Asia, being both regions the only ones with at-
tacks during 1991. Then, between 1992 and 1993, the 
threat was displaced. There were inverse correlations 
between both regions, with Southeast Asia showing 
an upward behavior, while East Asia showed num-
bers that progressively decreased over time.
From these facts, we can make five observa-
tions. First, between the decrease and increase 
during the time lapses, there was some geograph-
ical displacement of maritime piracy, and it took 
two years until it went up again. Secondly, the 
focus is Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Indian 
subcontinent from an accumulated perspective 
per region, state, or location. Third, from the re-
gional point of view, we observed a displacement 
from Southeast Asia to Africa during the first and 
second increase periods, and after Africa reduced 
its piracy levels, there has been no other increase. 
Fourth, the regions considered as second in im-
portance regarding piracy levels show dissimilar 
behavior in the increase periods: while the Indian 
subcontinent and America go up in the first in-
crease period, East Asia shows growth during the 
second increase period. Fifth, endogenous factors 
might explain the differentiation between America 
and Africa and between East Asia and Southeast 
Asia.
From a theoretical discussion, maritime piracy 
regarded as insecurity is characterized by tempo-
rality and location. Additionally, high vulnera-
bility (i.e., low military power and low cohesion) 
might explain displacements from one place to 
another in time and, at the same time, derive from 
the coercive response, as it is considered a threat 
to the military sector.
The types of attacks are the specific actions 
to attack merchant ships. For the full timeframe 
(1991-2019), “ship boarded” cases are the most 
common, not being outnumbered in any year and 
almost reaching 2/3 of the total, with 64.69 %. “At-
tempted boarding” cases are second, with 18.76 %, 
followed by the “fired upon” cases with 9.1 % and 
“hijacks” with 6.45 %. Lastly, and at an extremely 
low level, “detained,” “non stated,” and “missing” 
total 0.97 %. For the first increase period, “board-
ing” cases are the most important, followed by 
“attempted boarding”. For the second increase 
period, the total number is almost reached by 
“boarding”, “attempted boarding,” and “fired 
upon” cases. In some years, “fired upon” cases 
outnumber “attempted boarding” figures (Table 5; 
Figures 5, 6, and 7).
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Table	5. Total attacks by type 1991-2019
Type Number of cases Percentage
Boarded 4,962 64.69
Attempted boarding 1,439 18.76
Fired upon 698 9.10
Hijacked 495 6.45
Detained 41 0.53
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Figure	7. Total attacks by type 1991-2019 (C)
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It is observed that, for the first increase peri-
od, the attacks in Southeast Asia mainly consisted 
of boarding and attempted boarding. During the 
second increase period, the problem was concen-
trated in Africa and the Indian subcontinent, im-
plying a geographical movement and the inclusion 
of “fired upon” cases. 
The total attacks by type of arm have a low, 
specific record, making the characterization of 
maritime piracy difficult, as “non stated” cases 
show very high figures with 34.69 %, that is, a lit-
tle over one third. This figure is followed by “pi-
rates with guns” (29.29 %), “pirates with knives” 
(23.92 %), “other weapons” (6.71 %), and “pirates 
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unarmed” (5.37 %). The category “no arms” was re-
ported as of 2001; therefore, its low occurrence in 
the full period (1991– 2019) and the low number of 
registered cases maket this category insignificant. 
Something similar occurs with other arms. For the 
first increase period, not stated weapons, knives, 
and firearms occupied the top positions. For the 
second increase period, the order changes, with 
firearms in the first place, followed by not stated 
and knives (Table 6; Figures 8, 9, and 10).
Table	6. Total attacks by arm 1991-2019
Type Number of cases Percentage
Not stated 2,662 34.69
Pirates with guns 2,247 29.29
Pirates with knives 1.835 23.92
Other weapons 515 6.73
Pirates unarmed 412 5.37
Total 7,671 100
Source: Own elaboration.




























1 2 1 3 3








95 80 76 67 68 71
88
69 73 81 83
97







91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
World Pirates unarmed Pirates with knives
Source: Own elaboration.
166 ■P. Rivas Pardo
Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad ■ Vol. 16(1)
































































91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
World Not stated Pirates with guns
Source: Own elaboration.





























40 39 49 34







91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
World Other weapons
Source: Own elaboration.
As a general observation, the arms registered in 
the first increase period in Southeast Asia are not 
stated, then knives and firearms; for the second 
increase period, in Africa and the Indian subcon-
tinent, firearms take the first place, followed by not 
stated and knives. 
The type of violence to crew is different from 
total attacks, as its total number does not derive 
from piracy cases, but from the number of vic-
tims, reaching 12,957 between 1991 and 2019. In 
this case, the leading figures are 645 in 1997, 644 
in 2003, and 1,270 in 2010, partially matching 
piracy increase periods, as the first figure be-
longs to a different year (Table 7; Figures 11, 12, 
13, and 14).
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Table	7. Violence to crew 1991-2019
Type Number of cases Percentage
Crew taken hostage 9,642 74.41
Crew injured 819 6.32
Crew threatened 801 6.18
Kidnap/ransom 767 5.91
Crew/passengers killed 416 3.21
Crew assaulted 311 2.40
Crew missing 201 1.57
Total 12,957 100
Source: Own elaboration.
Figure	11. Violence to crew 1991-2019 (A)
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Figure	12. Violence to crew 1991-2019 (B)
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Figure	13. Violence to crew 1991-2019 (C)
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Figure	14. Violence to crew 1991-2019 (D)
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Bearing in mind their specific characteristics, 
“crew taken hostage” crimes lead the victim pop-
ulation with 74.41 %, while “crew missing” rep-
resents 1.55 % of the total, concentrated between 
2002 and 2009, having little importance. The re-
maining categories are below two digits: “crew in-
jured” with 6.32 %; “crew threatened” with6.18 %; 
“kidnap/ransom” with 5.91 %; “crew/passengers 
killed” with 3.21 %, and “crew assaulted” with 
2.40 %. For the first increase period, the crew being 
threatened, injured, killed, assaulted, and missing 
complete the remaining cases. The same occurs 
during the second increase period, though only 
the “kidnap/ ransom” type is included. Addition-
ally, more crew members were injured during the 
second increase period than in the first one.
The observation, in this case, is that “crew tak-
en hostage” is the primary type of violence exerted 
in Southeast Asia as the leading region during the 
first increase period; the same occurs in Africa 
and the Indian subcontinent during the second 
increase period, where “kidnap/ransom” appears 
as a new addition. Summing up this informa-
tion, changes in the attack location also implied a 
change in the type of attack, type of weapon used, 
and damage to crew. Likewise, the data exhibited 
permits to partially refute the theoretical discus-
sion, as this threat has quantities and qualities that 
make it objective reality.
The nationality of ships attacked for the 
full timeframe 1991–2019) shows 136 registered 
nationalities plus those not stated. Like total at-
tacks, 7,671 are merchant ships, where only 21 
nationalities have at least 1 % of the cases, a min-
imum of 76 cases each, totaling 77.0 % (Figures 
15, 16, and 17).
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Note.	Cases that account for at least 1 % of the total are presented. 
Source: Own elaboration.












Note. Cases that account for at least 1 % of the total are presented. 
Source: Own elaboration.
171Maritime Piracy and its Characterization as a Threat: Presence, Type, Arms, Violence, and Ships under Attack between 1991 and 2019
Revista de Relaciones Internacionales, Estrategia y Seguridad ■ Vol. 16(1)













Note. Cases that account for at least 1 % of the total are presented. 
Source: Own elaboration.
For the first increase period, with 2,121 cases, 
25 nationalities hold at least 1 % of the total. For 
the second increase period, there were 2,089 cas-
es, where 24 nationalities hold at least 1 % of the 
total. Nationalities for the full timeframe are con-
tained in both increase periods. However, Bangla-
desh, China, the United States, and Pakistan were 
added during the first increase period, while coun-
tries such as Germany, the United States, France, 
Italy, Malta, and Turkey were included during the 
second increase period, when the Philippines and 
Thailand disappear from the list.
Finally, the type of vessel attacked shows that 
for the full timeframe (1991–2019), there are 70 
types of vessels plus those not stated. As in the to-
tal number of attacks, 7,671 vessels were attacked; 
10 have at least 1 % of the cases, i.e., a minimum of 
76, reaching 90.07 % (Figures 18, 19, and 20). 
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Note. Cases that account for at least 1 % of the total are presented. 
Source: Own elaboration.
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Note.	Cases that account for at least 1 % of the total are presented. 
Source: Own elaboration.
The nationalities involved for the full time-
frame are contained in both increase periods, al-
though for the first increase period, Bangladesh, 
China, the United States, and Pakistan are added 
to the list. In the second increase period, Germany, 
the United States, France, Italy, Malta, and Turkey 
are incorporated, while the Philippines and Thai-
land are not on the list. 
For the first increase period, 11 types of ves-
sels were attacked, with at least 1 % each; that is, 
1,961 ships under attack, representing 92.45 % of 
2,121 types of vessels for the period. For the sec-
ond increase period, 12 types of vessels were at-
tacked, each with at least 1 %, representing 94.97 % 
of 2,089 for such period. The types of vessels for 
the full timeframe are contained in both increase 
periods, but during the first one, the “RORO” type 
was added, while during the second one, “RORO” 
and “vehicle carrier” were included.
Finally, through the classification of ships un-
der attack, it is possible to recreate the intensity of 
maritime piracy, i.e., agents, space, time, probabil-
ity, impact, and history. 
Conclusions
In the introduction to this article, we concluded 
that, if maritime trade exists, so does maritime 
piracy, due to the age of its records—in Greece and 
Rome—, the name it has received over the years in 
different languages—Dutch, French, and Latin—, 
and its presence in different locations. Another 
idea presented here was that it meets the minimum 
requirement to be an illegal activity with revenues, 
which in terms of the unclos’ and imo’s defini-
tion, is basically the same, especially when analyz-
ing the icc data.
As a first statement, the data analysis shows a 
timeframe that extends between 1991 and 2019, 
being the first increase period between 1998 and 
2003 and the second increase period between 2006 
and 2011. Consequently, the first answer to our re-
search question (How does the 21st century’s mar-
itime piracy characterize as a threat?) is as follows, 
concerning this timeframe and based on the most 
reliable records on maritime piracy: 
1. For the full timeframe between 1991 to 2019, the 
main regions affected are Southeast Asia and Af-
rica, particularly Indonesia, Somalia/Djibouti, 
Nigeria, Bangladesh, and India. The principal 
types of attacks are “ship boarding” and “at-
tempted boarding.” The most common violence 
type is “crew taken hostage.” The ships under 
attack come mainly from Panama, Liberia, and 
Singapore, and the most common ships under 
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attack are bulk carrier, chemical/product tanker, 
container, and general cargo. The types of arms 
are not included, as these are distributed on a 
more equative, non-distinctive basis. 
2. For the first increase period between 1998 and 
2003, the most affected regions are Southeast Asia 
and the Indian subcontinent; in detail, the most 
affected States and locations are Indonesia, Ban-
gladesh, the Strait of Malacca, India, and Malay-
sia. The most common types of attacks are “ship 
boarding” and “attempted boarding.” The most 
common weapons used are knives, firearms, and 
other types. The type of violence most exerted is 
“crew taken hostage.” As for the most common 
nationalities of the ships under attack, these are 
from Panama, Singapore, Malaysia, and Cyprus. 
The most attacked types of ships are bulk carrier, 
chemical tanker, container, and general cargo.
3. For the second increase period between 2006 
and 2011, the most affected regions are Africa and 
Southeast Asia; the States or locations most af-
fected are Somalia/Djibouti, the Red Sea/Gulf 
of Aden, Indonesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and 
Malaysia. The most found types of attacks are 
“ship boarding” and “attempted boarding,” “fired 
upon,” and “knife” attacks. Violence is mainly 
exerted through “crew taken hostage.” The ships 
affected usually come from Panama, Liberia, 
Singapore, and the Marshall Islands. The most 
affected types of ships are bulk carrier, tanker 
(crude oil), and container.
4. For the full timeframe, as well as for both piracy 
increase periods, the figures informed are less rel-
evant for East Asia, America, and the rest of the 
world and the following types of attacks: “miss-
ing ships,” “unarmed attacks,” “other weapons,” 
“killings,” “assault,” and “missing.”
As a second statement, the facts just presented 
and explained under the theory of the Copenha-
gen School prove that:
1. The security of maritime trade, understood as its 
independence and functionality, is transgressed 
by maritime piracy. At the same time, insecuri-
ty turned into vulnerability and threats explains 
the direct relationship with maritime piracy; that 
is to say, wherever weak armed capacity can be 
found, maritime piracy will emerge.
2. Piracy as a threat may be characterized as an ob-
jective fact, given the information published by 
the icc. It is also possible to state that it is a threat 
inherent to the military sector, given the response 
provided by the States and the International Sys-
tem is the coercive action, involving movements 
and reduction of the threat.
3. Maritime piracy is high in those regions and lo-
cations where most attacks have occurred to the 
most common ship nationalities, as their identity 
is clear, the distance is closer, the time is near, the 
probability and impact are high, and the history 
is extended. On the contrary, for those regions, 
locations and nationalities with the lowest mar-
itime piracy records, intensity is low as a threat, 
being considered only a risk.
If we explain variability from the beginning 
of the timeframe analyzed, piracy existed almost 
exclusively in East Asia and Southeast Asia, to 
later grow during the first increase period as ex-
plained by Chalk (2008). Southeast Asia was then 
the primary destination that later decreased, and 
Africa had an increase during the second period 
(between 2006 and 2011), which later went down 
after armed action, as pointed out by Marin (2011) 
and Moral (2015).
Regarding vulnerabilities, maritime piracy 
shows movements, which might be explained by 
the affected regions’, States’, or locations’ internal 
insecurity. The most significant movements occur 
from Southeast Asia to Africa, showing an indirect 
correlation for the entire period. Other marked 
differences can be found between America and Af-
rica, which had similar figures, but turned distant 
later; the same occurred between East Asia and 
Southeast Asia. In both cases, the latter were the 
center of high increases in maritime piracy activi-
ty. These regions’ vulnerability might well explain 
the reason for the increase and movement of pi-
racy to these places. More research could be done 
later to analyze those countries’ strength through 
Failed States and Democracy reports.
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As for its features as a threat, piracy is hetero-
geneous, and the best way to describe it is in re-
lation to time and space. A reflection on piracy is 
that, as a threat, it can be classified as inherent to 
the military sector due to its coercive agents with 
no explicit classification of the threatening action; 
instead, it is an implicit or tacit threat, in which 
the attack is discrete and without previous demon-
stration. On the other hand, facts prove that the 
armed forces are used coercively against private 
and criminal agents with high coercive power.
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